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Weighted utility models attempt to account for risk preferences in terms of 
an expectation-like equation applied to the subjective evaluation of prob- 
abilities and outcomes, while Portfolio theory assumes that risk preference is a 
function of expected value and perceived risk. A pair of empirical predictions 
which contrasts Portfolio theory with all weighted utility models is derived and 
tested. Results indicate that both theories are in error. In the case of Portfolio 
theory, it is clearly the axiom of single-peakedness over risk that is violated. 
A number of theories of decision making under risk belong to the gen- 
eral category of weighted utility models (Anderson & Shanteau, 1970; 
Edwards, 1955, 1962; Karmarkar, 1978; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). If 
we let gamble A be denoted by (x,, Pl ; x2, P2 ; • • .; xn, p,) where Pl, p2, 
. . . .  pn are the probabilities of obtaining outcomes Xl, x2 . . . . .  x~, then 
according to the weighted utility principle, the weighted utility of this 
gamble is 
WU(A) = [ w ( p O V ( x O  + w(p2)V(xz )  + . . .  
+ w t p . ) V ( x . ) ] / W ( p , ,  p2 . . . .  , p.), 
where w and V are function on the probabilities and outcomes, respec- 
tively, and W is a function on the probability distribution. Furthermore, if 
we have two risky options, A and B, then, 
A >v B if and only if WU(A) > WU(B), 
where >p represents a weak order on preference. In most cases the func- 
tion W is a constant. 
One theory which does not fall into this category is Portfolio Theory 
(Coombs, 1969, 1975; van Santen, 1978). According to Portfolio Theory, 
the preference order on a set of gambles is mediated by two variables; (1) 
the expected value (EV)  and (2) the perceived riskiness of each of the 
gambles. Furthermore, whenever a set of gambles are equal in EV,  then 
the preference order on these gambles is single-peaked over the risk 
order. That is, if we have three gambles, A, B, and C for which 
E V ( A )  = EV(B)  = EV(C) ,  
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and 
A >r B >r C, 
where >r denotes a weak order or risk, then, 
B >p A or B >p C, 
or both. 
The concept of risk, however, is left undefined. In order to test 
Portfolio Theory, therefore, it is necessary to make some ad hoc assump- 
tions about risk. When such assumptions are made, however, Portfolio 
Theory usually does an excellent job of predicting experimental results 
(Coombs, Donnell, & Kirk, 1978; Coombs & Huang, 1970, 1962). Particu- 
larly impressive are the results in Coombs et al. (1976) where single- 
peakedness over risk was satisfied even though some of the stimuli were 
complex, viz., four outcome lotteries. To date, there is no published 
evidence showing any consistent violations of the single-peakedness 
axiom. 
In this paper a pair of contrasting properties of weighted utility models 
and Portfolio Theory is derived and experimentally tested. 
Consider the set of all three outcome gambles of the form 
(X + K, P; - X  + K, P; K, 1 - 2P). 
It is obvious that any gamble of this form in uniquely defined by its 
expected value (K), range (2X) and the symmetric probability of winning 
or losing (P). Therefore, any gamble of this form can be rewritten as 
(K, R, P), 
where K is the expected value of the gamble, R is the range, and P is the 
symmetric probability. For example, the gamble 
($1, .25; -$1,  .25; $0, .5) 
can be rewritten as 
($0, $2, .25). 
In order to examine what Portfolio Theory says about the preference 
order on this set of gambles, we must first have some knowledge about the 
risk order. ForLunately, much of the risk order on this set of gambles is 
obvious. To begin with, risk increases as R increases. That is, if we have 
two gambles, A and A',  which are identical in every way except that the 
range of A is greater than the range ofA' ,  it is intuitively compelling thatA 
is riskier than A'.  Similarly, it is also intuitively compelling to assume that 
risk increases as P, the symmetric probability, increases. By increasing P, 
we have in effect increased the variance by making it more likely that one 
of the two extreme outcomes will occur. 
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Both of these assumptions about risk have been supported experimen- 
tally. Coombs and Bowen (1971a, 1971b), Coombs and Huang (1970), and 
Huang (1971) all found that, when EV was held constant, risk judgments 
increased monotonically with increasing variance and range. In addition, 
as a result of  an experiment studying preferences Coombs and Huang 
(1976; see also Coombs, 1976) also concluded that, when EV was held 
constant, risk was monotone with P. In all of these experiments, several 
different EV levels were used. 
Given these assumptions about risk in this set of gambles, it is shown in 
the Appendix that for a preference order on a finite set of gambles with 
constant EV, the following three independent properties are necessary 
and sufficient conditions for there to exist a risk order, ~>r, on the gambles 
such that, 
(i) the preference order is single-peaked over the risk order, and 
(ii) the risk order is strictly monotone with increasing P and R. 
Property 1. Given any three gambles of the form 
(K, R, P), (K, R', P), (K, R", e) ,  
,where R > R' > R", then 
(K, R', P) >p (K, R, P) 
o r  
(K, R', P) >p (K, R", P). 
Property 2. Given any three gambles of the form 
(K, R, P), (K, R, P'), (K, R, P"), 
where P > P '  > P", then 
(K, R, P')  >p (K, R, P) 
o r  
(K, R, P') >p (K, R, e"). 
Properties 1 and 2 follow directly from the definition of single peakedness 
and say in effect that preference is single peaked over range and symmet- 
ric probability. 
Property 3. Given any four gambles of the form 
(K, R, P), (K, R', P), (K, R, P'), (K, R', P'), 
where R > R' a n d P  > P ' ,  then, 
(K, R', P) and (K, R, P')  >p (K, R, P) 
o r  
(K, R', P) and (K, R, P')  >p (K, R', e ' ) .  
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Portofolio Theory, therefore, implies that properties 1 to 3 will be satis- 
fied whenever the expected value is held constant. 
A useful prediction that can be derived from property 3 is that, when an 
intermediate risk level is preferred, the preference orders on P and R 
cannot be mutually independent. This result is derived as follows. Let A, 
B, C, andD be :symmetric gambles withP > P', R > R', andK a constant. 
Range 
Probability 
p '  p 
R C D 
R' A B 
Given the previous assumptions about risk, we have D >rB, C >rA; and 
by single peakedness over risk we get 
B and C >p A 
or (1) 
B and C >p D, 
which is the same as property 3. 
The definition of mutual independence however requires that, 
A >p C if and only if B >p D 
and 
A >p B ff and only if C >p D. 
Suppose B is preferred to both A and D, then mutual independence of 
probability and range requires that A and D be preferred to C, which 
violates (1). Similarly, if C is preferred to both A and D, then mutual 
independence requires that both A and D be preferred to B, which also 
violates (1). In this example, note that ifB or C is preferred to bothA and 
D, and 
B and C > ,  A, 
then we have an instance in which the most preferred range size decreases 
from R to R' when the probability increases from P'  to P. Similarly, if we 
have 
B and C >p D, 
then we have a case in which the most preferred probability decreases 
from P to P '  when the range increases. Property 3 of the Portfolio Theory 
therefore predicts that, given the appropriate conditions, increasing the 
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symmetric probability will lead people to prefer a smaller range; while 
increasing the range will lead people to prefer smaller probabilities. 
Weighted utility models, on the other hand, disagree with property 3. In 
particular, all weighted utility models predict the following property. 
Property 4. For all K fixed, the preference order over R is independent 
of the preference order over P. That is, 
(K, R, P) >p (K, R', P), 
if and only if 
(K, R, e ' )  >p (K, R', P'). 
This property is derived as follows. By the weighted utility principle, 
(K, R, P) >p (K, R', P), 
if and only if 
w(P)V[K + (R/2)] + w(P)V[K - (R/2)] + w(1 - 2P)V(K) 
> w(P)V[K + (R'/2)] + w(P)V[K - (R'/2)] 
+ w O  - 2 P ) V ( K ) ,  
which is true if and only if 
V[K + (R/2)] + V[K - (R/2)] > V[K + (R'/2)] + V[K - (R'/2)]. 
Since this last inequality does not include P, it is immediate that the 
preference order over R, with P held constant, is independent of the 
choice of P. 
Note that the derivation of property 4 relies primarily on the assump- 
tion that the evaluation of the probabilities is independent of the outcome 
each probability is associated with. 
Weighted utility models therefore predict that preference for range is 
independent of the symmetric probability, while Portfolio Theory predicts 
that increasing the probability will, in certain cases, lead to preference 
for a smaller range. 
The following experiment tests these four properties. 
METHOD 
Subjects 
The subjects were 20 student volunteers from the University of 
Michigan paid subject pool. 
Stimuli 
The gambles in this experiment were all of the (K, R, P) form mentioned 
above, and were constructed as indicated in Table 1. There were three sets 
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TABLE 1 
GAMBLES USED AS STIMULI 
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R 
P $.50 $1 $2. $4 $8 
Set I (EV = $0) 
.5 ($0,$.50,.5) ($0 ,$1 , .5)  ($1~,$2,.5) ($0,$4, .5)  ($0,$8,.5) 
.4 ($0,$.50,.4) ($0,$1 , . 4 )  ($0,$2, .4)  ($0,$4, .4)  ($0,$8,.4) 
.3 ($0,$.50,.3) ($0 ,$1 , .3)  ($0,$2, .3)  ($0,$4, .3)  ($0,$8,.3) 
.2 ($0,$.50,.2) ($0,$1,2) ($0,$2, .2)  ($0,$4, .2)  ($0,$8,.2) 
.i ($0,$.50,.1) ($0 ,$1 , .1)  (0 ,$2 , .1 )  ($0 ,$4 , .1)  ($0,$8,.1) 
Set II (EV = $2) 
.5 ($2,$2,.5) ($2,$4, .5)  ($2,$8,.5) 
.4 ($2,$2,.4) ($2,$4, .4)  ($2,$8,.4) 
.3 ($2,$2,.3) ($2,$4, .3)  ($2,$8,.3) 
.2 ($2,$2,.2) ($2,$4, .2)  ($2,$8,.2) 
• 1 ($2 ,$2 , .1)  ($2,$4, .  1) ($2,$8, .  1) 
Set III (EV = $5) 
.5 ($5,$2,.5) ($5,$4, .5)  ($5,$8,.5) 
.4 ($5,$2,.4) ($5,$4, .4)  ($5,$8,.4) 
.3 ($5,$2,.3) ($5,$4, .3)  ($5,$8,.3) 
.2 ($5,$2,.2) ($5,$4, .2)  ($5,$8,.2) 
• 1 ($5,$2, .  1) ($5,$4, .  1) ($5,$8, .  1) 
of  gambles. The 25 gambles in Set I are all at E V  = $0. The 15 gambles in 
Sets II and III are at E V  = $2 and E V  = $5, respectively.  
Out of  Sets I, II, and I I I a  total of  47 subsets of  gambles were con- 
structed. Thirty-one of  these subsets were taken from Set I. The five rows 
and five columns of  Set I in Table 1 make up 10 of  these 31 subsets. An 
additional 16 consisted of  those 2 × 2 submatrices from Set I in Table 1 
which had two adjacent levels of  range and two adjacent levels of  proba- 
bility. For  example,  the set ($0, $.50, .  1), ($0, $.50, .2), ($0, $1.00,.  1), ($0, 
$1.00, .2) was one of  these subsets. Five additional subsets, one o f  size 5 
and the rest of  size 4, were constructed from gambles of  extreme range (R 
= $.50 or $8.00) or extreme probability (P = .  1 or .5). These last 5 subsets 
were added to guarantee that the subjects would be presented an equal 
number  of  pair comparison replications on all pairs of  gambles that corre- 
spond to adjacent cells in Set I. 
Eight subsets were constructed from Set II. They  correspond to the 
eight rows and columns in the second matrix in Table 1. In a similar 
manner,  eight subsets were constructed from Set III. 
All gambles were represented by a picture of  a spinner board without the 
spinner. Both the winning and losing amounts and the probabilities were 
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stated numerically. Furthermore, the probabilities were also represented 
by appropriate sections on the spinner board. The 47 subsets of gambles 
were presented to the subjects in the form of 47 small stacks of cards. On 
each card there was a picture representation of one gamble. 
Procedure 
Each subject participated in one experimental session, which lasted 
approximately 1 hr. After being familiarized with the gambles, subjects 
were asked to rank order the gambles in each subset with respect to 
preference. They were instructed to do this under the assumption that 
they would be playing only one gamble once. 
The order of the gambles in each subset and the order in which the 
subsets were presented to each subject was randomized. 
RESULTS 
The first property of Portofolio Theory is that preference is single 
peaked over range. Table 2 gives the number of monotone, strictly folded 
(i.e., single peaked but not monotone), and non-single-peaked orders that 
subjects produced when they rank ordered sets of gambles with constant 
probability. Note that a monotone order is a special type of single-peaked 
order, so both monotone and strictly folded orders are consistent with 
Portfolio Theory. 
Table 2 indicates that 90% of the 300 preference orders are single 
peaked. Since, by chance, we would expect only 46% of the orders to be 
single peaked, this result strongly supports property 1 of Portfolio 
Theory. 
The second property of Portfolio Theory is that preference is single 
peaked over the symmetric probability. Table 3 gives the number of 
TABLE 2 
CLASSIFICATION OF PREFERENCE ORDERS OVER 
RANGE WITH PROBABILITY HELD CONSTANT 
Monotone Strictly folded Non-single-peaked 
orders orders orders 
E V  = $0 74 21 5 
EV = $2 56 32 12 
EV = $5 71 16 13 
Total 201 (67%) 69 (23%) 30 (10%) 
Number expected 
by chance 68.3 78.3 153.3 
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TABLE 3 
CLASSIFICATION OF PREFERENCE ORDERS OVER 
PROBABILITY WITH RANGE HELD CONSTANT 
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Monotone S~ictly folded Non-single-peaked 
orders orders orders 
E V  = $ 0  43 30 17 
E V  = $2 24 22 14 
E V  = $5 25 18 17 
Total 102 (46%) 70 (32%) 48 (22%) 
Number expected 
by chance 3.7 25.7 190.7 
monotone, strictly folded, and nonpeaked orders that subjects produced 
when they rank ordered sets of gambles with range held constant. 
Table 3 indicates that 78% of the 220 preference orders are single 
peaked. By chance, we would have expected only 13% to be single 
peaked. Therefore, property 2 of  Portfolio Theory is also verified. 
Subjects rank ordered 16 subsets of four gambles each in which both 
range and probability were varied. For each of these subsets, there were 
24 possible rank orders. Of the 24 possible rank orders, 12 satisfy the 
weighted utility property of independence of  range with probability. Six of  
these 12 orders are consistent with property 3 of Portfolio Theory, while 
the remaining 6 orders violate Portfolio Theory. For the 12 orders that 
violate independence of range with probability, 6 show a smaller range 
preference with increasing probability, and 6 show a greater range prefer- 
ence with increasing probability. Therefore, of the 12 orders which violate 
independence of  range with probability, 6 satisfy and 6 violate Portfolio 
Theory. Table 4 gives the observed number of rank orders in each of these 
categories. 
TABLE 4 
CLASSIFICATION OF PREFERENCE ORDERS FOR THE SIXTEEN 2 X 2 SUBMATRICES 
Satisfy Violate 
Portfolio Theory Portfolio Theory 
Satisfy 
weighted utility 216 64 b 
Violate 
weighted utility 25" 15 ~'b 
" The probability of obtaining a ratio of 25:15 in an equal probability binomial distribu- 
tion is less than .08. In future tables this will be marked as p (25:15) < .08 (one-tailed test). 
b p(64:25) < .00Ol (one-tailed test). 
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The data in Table 4 indicate that the weighted utility property of inde- 
pendence of range with probability does a better job of accounting for the 
preference orders than Portfolio Theory (p > .001). However, for those 
preference orders which do violate property 4, the majority satisfy 
Portfolio Theory. Though the size of the effect is small (p < .08), this last 
result suggests that the property of independence of range with probabil- 
ity is violated in a manner consistent with Portfolio Theory; that is, in- 
creasing the symmetric probability leads to preference for a smaller range. 
In order to examine this prediction of decreasing range preference with 
increasing probability more thoroughly, we reexamined the preference 
orders in the following manner. At each EV level, we compared the most 
preferred level of range at the smallest level of probability for which 
preference was single-peaked over range, with the most preferred level of 
range at the highest probability level for which range preference was 
single-peaked. In this way, we could examine the changes in range prefer- 
ence as we went from low to high probability. According to property 3 of 
Portfolio Theory, we would expect preference orders at each EV level to 
be either (1) consistently monotone over range, in which case indepen- 
dence of range from probability will be satisfied, or (2) sometimes strictly 
folded over range, in which case, when the probability increased, there 
should be a trend toward decreasing range preference. Weighted utility 
models, on the other hand, predict that independence of range with prob- 
ability will always be satisfied. Table 5 gives the number of subjects for 
whom range preference increased, decreased, or stayed the same as the 
symmetric probability increased. The data in Table 5 clearly indicates a 
trend toward decreasing range preference. In particular, we note that 
there was only one case of increasing range preference (p < .003). How- 
TABLE 5 
CHANGES IN RANGE PREFERENCE WITH INCREASING PROBABILITY 
No change 
Smaller Monotone Folded Larger 
range orders orders range 
Satisfy PT Satisfy PT Violate PT Violate PT Cannot 
Violate WU Satisfy WU Satisfy WU Violate WU test 
E V  = 0 4 14 2 0 0 
E V  = 2 4 9 5 1 1 
E V  = 5 3 13 3 0 1 
Total 11 ~ 36 10 1 a 2 
r, p ( l l : l )  < .003 (one-tailed test). 
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ever, it should also be noted that, in many instances, range preference 
remained unchanged. 
Summarizing these last two results, we find that, as the probability 
increases, there is a trend toward decreasing range preference. However, 
this effect is not as strong and does not occur as often as Portfolio Theory 
would imply, but occurs more often than any weighted utility model could 
account for. 
DISCUSSION 
These results indicate that both Portfolio Theory and weighted utility 
models are inadequate theories of risky decision making. 
In the case of Portfolio Theory, either the single-peakedness axiom or 
one of the risk assumptions must be incorrect. The fact that the risk 
assumptions are both intuitively reasonable and empirically well sup- 
ported, therefore, suggests that it is the single-peakedness axiom that is in 
error. Furthermore, if the single-peakedness axiom were hypothesized to 
be correct, it would be difficult to explain how preference could be single 
peaked over the dimensions of range and symmetric probability (recall 
that properties 1 and 2 were satisfied), when risk does not increase 
monotonically with these dimensions. 
In the case of the weighted utility models, it is the assumption that 
probabilities and outcomes are assessed independently that appears to be 
violated. This would suggest that risk preferences cannot be adequately 
represented by a model which proposes that preference judgments reflect 
a simple composition of outcomes and probabilities. 
APPENDIX: PROOF OF PROPERTIES 1, 2, AND 3 
The following proof of properties 1-3 relies heavily on work found in 
Lehner (1980). 
Let G be a set of gambles of the (K, R, P) form. Assume that all the 
gambles in G have the same expected value. We begin with the following 
lemma. 
Lemma 1 
Properties 1-3 are satisfied if and only if, for any three distinct gambles, 
(K, R, P), (K, R', P'), (K, R", P"), 
with R /> R' 1> R" and P >i P' >! P", we have 
(K, R', P')  >p (K, R, P) 
or (A1) 
(K, R', P') >p (K, R", P"). 
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Proof 
Properties 1 -3  are all special cases of (A1), consequently we need only 
show that properties 1-3  imply (A1). 
Assume that we have at least two range levels (R, R') and three proba- 
bility levels (P, P' ,  P"). Assume also that there exist three gambles in G 
which violate (A1), but do not violate properties 1-3.  
In order to violate (A1) we must have three gambles for which 
(K, R, P) ~>p (K, R, ', P') 
and 
(A2) 
(K, R", P") >~p (K, R', P'). 
By property 3 we have 
(K, R', P) >p (K, R, P) or (K, R', P ' )  (A3) 
and 
(K, R', e") >p (K, R', e ' )  or (K, R", e"). (A4) 
Combining (A2) and (A3) gives us 
(K, R', P) >p (K, R', e ' ) .  (A5) 
Similarly, (A2) and (A4) together imply 
(K, R' ,  e") >o (g, R', e ' ) .  (A6) 
Finally, combining (A5) and (A6) gives us 
(K, R', P) and (K, R', P") >p (K, R', P'). (A7) 
This last inequality violates property 2, so we have a contradiction. 
In cases where there are only two probability levels, but at least three 
range levels, a similar proof showing a violation of property 1 could be 
constructed. In cases where there are less than three levels of both range 
and symmetric probability no special proof is needed, since one of the 
three properties can be applied to any three-element subset. 
Lemma 2 
For the set of gambles G, a weak ordering, >~p, is single peaked over 
some risk ordering, ~>r, that is strictly monotone with increasing range and 
probability if and only if (A1) is never violated. 
Proof 
See theorems 1 and 2 and lemma 6 in Lehner (1980). 
Together, lemmas 1 and 2 immediately imply the following theorem. 
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T heorem  ] 
A weak  order ing ,  ~>p, is single peaked  ove r  some risk order ing ,  ~>r, that  
inc reases  m o n o t o n i c a l l y  with range  and  probabi l i ty  if and  on ly  if prop-  
ert ies  1 - 3  are satisfied.  
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